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The recent Constitutional Court 
judgment rendering the Communal 
Land Rights Act (CLARA) unconstitu-
tional (Tongoane and Others v Minister 
for Agriculture and Land Affairs and 
Others) must not be allowed to throw 
decentralisation policy making into 
disarray. Decentralisation holds much 
potential for lively, participatory dem-
ocratic law making and enforcement, 
through which rural women can gain 
greater power and secure more rights. 
However, there are many challenges in 
the often fraught context of decentral-
ised law and power.
While the South African Constitu-
tion seeks to move South African law 
away from ‘despotic decentralisa-
tion’ (Mamdani 1996; McClendon & 
Thomas 2003:53) towards decentral-
ised democracy, recent government 
legislation (e.g. Traditional Leadership 
and Governance Framework Act 41 of 
2003, Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 
2004 and the Traditional Courts Bill 
B15-2008) seems to revert to the old 
model by giving extensive, state-en-
dorsed powers to (usually male) ‘senior 
traditional leaders’ in rural commu-
nities. In this form, decentralisation 
could allow arcane oppressive practices 
to go undetected, unmonitored and 
undefeated.
Therefore, it is essential that all 
decentralisation policy be guided 
by constitutional principles. As the 
Constitutional Court reiterated in its 
recent ruling, the democratic process is 
integral to law making and democracy 
might be legitimately realised by using 
non-repressive indigenous law in land 
reform solutions. In this policy brief, 
we explore the guiding principles 
necessary to safeguard democratic 
decentralisation, and how state law 
and living customary law can be better 
woven together so that women can 
build on existing successes to secure 
rights and gain access to land. 
Introduction
Democratic decentralisation is still in 
the process of being worked out in 
South Africa; the real-life relationships 
between the state, traditional authority 
and governance structures form the 
backdrop to the process. Real tensions 
arise between the different structures, 
since the Constitution establishes a 
state-governed and constitutionally 
determined legal and institutional order 
and simultaneously accommodates 
traditional laws and institutions. The 
troubling collaborative relationship 
between ‘the institution of traditional 
leadership’ and former colonial and 
apartheid governments also creates 
tension, given that, as Mamdani (1996: 
109) describes:
[…] the decentralisation, from and by 
the [former colonial and apartheid] 
state, of despotic power centralised 
to individual chiefs within sometimes 
manufactured indigenous communi-
ties for purposes of achieving state 
control over the members of that 
community.
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In such systems, direct rule was not 
only about institutional arrangements; 
it was also about state distortion, ex-
ploiting decentralised (i.e. local, in-
digenous) laws, inventing new official 
‘customary’ law, and enabling govern-
ment-empowered despotic chiefs to 
enforce repressive laws. Although the 
Constitution sought to address some 
of these problems, recent laws have 
reverted to the earlier model, giving 
the (usually male) traditional leaders 
power to administer land, make laws, 
resolve disputes and enforce law. Such 
powers have all been conferred on tra-
ditional leaders without adequately 
consulting rural constituents in draft-
ing the laws. Moreover, the new laws 
depend mostly on artificial boundaries 
demarcated by the Bantu Authorities 
Act 68 of 1951, yet deny rural people 
the right to opt out of a traditional 
leader’s jurisdiction.
In declaring CLARA unconstitutional, 
the Constitutional Court confirmed 
the reading of recent laws as rein-
forcing decentralised despotism, but 
also highlighted opportunities for 
women’s land rights security that exist 
amidst the challenges. Since the state 
does not generally have the power, 
resources and access to customary 
communities to secure women’s rights 
for them, recognising, encouraging 
and supporting healthy decentralisa-
tion is necessary, at least as an interim 
measure.
This means observing and facilitating 
the democratisation of customary 
institutions and laws internally. 
Though living customary law and the 
institutions that affect it are often 
regarded as inimical and detrimental 
to human rights – especially women’s 
rights – recent scholarship (e.g. Nyamu 
Musembi 2002, 2005) has persuasively 
argued that living customary law offers 
spaces and opportunities for women to 
gain rights security.
This policy brief explores how such 
spaces and opportunities can be used 
to guide decentralised policy making in 
the future.
Living customary law 
as a site for contesting 
women’s rights
Scholarship which challenges the 
notion of custom and rights as op-
positional makes room for the view 
that rural women weave customs 
and rights together, while articulat-
ing claims and struggling for greater 
recognition of their rights in their 
communities. Therefore, the notion 
of rights as trumps has been rejected 
in favour of more nuanced concep-
tions of relational rights (Nedelsky 
1993, 2008), conceived through the 
contests of the people to whom they 
apply (Mamdani 1990; Merry 1996, 
2001; Nyamu Musembi 2005). So rights 
are not about protecting individu-
als or enabling their autonomy from 
one another, but instead facilitate an 
autonomy enabled and supported by 
the relationships on which individuals 
depend, through their connectedness 
and mutual reliance (Nedelsky 1993). 
Thus the process by which rights come 
into being is as important to rights 
protection as the substance of such 
rights. Processes which determine rights 
are integral to their defence. So when 
women take part in rights struggles in 
their communities, it is important to 
pay attention to the terms in which 
struggles are conducted, the language 
of culture they employ, and the lens 
through which rights are mobilised 
(Nyamu Musembi 2002).
Women employ languages of 
both rights and culture, often 
simultaneously, to claim and advance 
their rights in their communities, 
as shown in accounts of single and 
widowed women in some communi-
ties who have made successful claims 
at family, headmen’s and chiefs’ coun-
cils and courts to extend their land 
rights beyond the confines of mar-
riage and family. Specifically, these 
women have claimed that they – like 
their male counterparts – are chil-
dren of their communities and need 
land on which to raise their own chil-
dren. Recognising this, councils have 
granted them access to land as chil-
dren of the community, and thus also 
as legitimate rights holders. In other 
situations, councils and courts have 
slowly and less explicitly broadened 
women’s rights and access in answer 
to practical needs. For example, a 
council might recognise that discord 
can be caused in families when women 
who bear children outside of marriage 
are forced to live in their birth home 
or their brothers’ homes with their 
children. Therefore, some traditional 
councils allow women plots of land on 
which to raise their children, although 
sometimes these plots are in their son’s 
or an older male relative’s name.
Women’s rights are not entirely secure 
in this decentralised matrix of law 
and authority. Progressive changes 
are variable and women are still very 
oppressed in some places, either 
because they do not have ready or 
equal access to land, or because they 
may not take part in customary forums 
and structures, or speak for themselves 
even when they do. However, rights 
exist and can be realised in the context 
of custom. Women have the scope 
to (successfully) mobilise for change 
and gain support from their male 
counterparts in doing so – in their local 
communities and within the confines 
of living customary law.
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Conventional rights discourse which 
sees rights and customs in opposition 
does not leave space for such rights-
oriented change to occur on the ground. 
A relational understanding of rights, 
however, allows for the possibility of 
reconciling state and customary law in 
legislative frameworks, so as to better 
support women’s struggles for rights 
and thereby improve the prospects of 
making women’s rights a reality. 
Reconciliation between state and 
living customary law can be achieved 
by broadening women’s involvement 
in formulating solutions and ensuring 
that women participate in the spaces 
where critical decisions are made on 
legal matters that affect them.
CLARA and the 
Constitutional Court 
decision
Recent legislation on traditional law 
and decentralisation tends not to 
support women’s rights contestations, 
or the rights they have secured through 
such contestations. The Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act (TLGFA) gave the impression of 
being progressive and transforming the 
institution of traditional leadership, 
but it has instead reinforced the 
despotic powers created by apartheid 
government legislation, for example 
by simply converting former traditional 
authorities, defined by the Bantu 
Authorities Act, into traditional 
councils. 
While TLGFA provisions on the 
composition of traditional councils set 
quotas of 40% elected councillors and 
30% women, the TLGFA also permits 
the Premier of the relevant province 
to exempt a traditional council where 
there are insufficient female candidates 
to appoint. This solution to the lack 
of women candidates does nothing 
to address the deep inequalities in 
experience and confidence resulting 
from a patriarchal system of authority 
that automatically disqualified women, 
or conditioned them to self-deselect, 
and may thus have rendered them 
ineligible for participation. 
The TLGFA also allows traditional 
councils to get involved in various 
administrative areas, including land. 
Depending on each TLGFA’s boundaries, 
CLARA permits a traditional council to 
administer land in terms of community 
rules. However, allowing these 
centralised structures to make decisions 
about land rights in communal areas at 
the macro level runs counter to culture, 
which provides for a more inclusive 
decision-making model for land to 
take place at multiple community 
levels, depending on who uses the 
land. Therefore, CLARA assigned most 
decision-making power to structures 
in which women may have the most 
limited participation (compared to the 
greater participation they might enjoy 
in forums at lower, less intimidating 
levels of authority). Therefore, women 
might not have an equal say in how land 
rights are determined and structured. 
CLARA requires that a land rights 
enquiry be done that might convert 
old order rights into new order rights. 
In CLARA, land rights can be attrib-
uted to either the community or the 
individual (‘the community’ being in 
most cases defined according to TLGFA 
boundaries), but not to family units. 
Such rules are problematic if one con-
siders that many women’s land rights 
are embedded in the rights held by 
their families. When specific provision 
is made for women’s rights to land, 
CLARA anticipates married women 
but makes no provision for single 
women. By ignoring the layered and 
nested nature of customary commu-
nities, therefore, CLARA undermines 
single women’s land rights. 
This is only a sample of CLARA’s 
provisions. More detail is rendered 
unnecessary by the Constitutional Court 
finding the Act unconstitutional.
The Constitutional Court’s decision 
was reached on purely procedural 
grounds, as CLARA had been passed by 
an incorrect procedure in Parliament 
(i.e. section 76 instead of section 75 
of the Constitution). The process 
excluded provinces from playing the 
significant role assigned to them by the 
Constitution in passing legislation that 
affects their constituents. According to 
Paragraph 66 of the ruling:
These procedural safeguards are de-
signed to give more weight to the 
voices of the provinces in legislation 
substantially affecting them. But they 
are more than just procedural safe-
guards; they are fundamental to the 
role of the NCOP [National Council of 
Provinces] in ensuring ‘that provincial 
interests are taken into account in 
the national sphere of government’, 
and for ‘providing a national forum 
for public consideration of issues af-
fecting the provinces’. They also pro-
vide citizens within each province 
with the opportunity to express their 
views to their respective provincial 
legislatures on the legislation under 
consideration. They do this through 
the public involvement process that 
provincial legislatures, in terms of 
section 118(1)(a) of the Constitution, 
must facilitate.
Therefore, in Paragraph 106 of the 
ruling the Court emphasised that: 
[…] our Constitution manifestly con-
templated public participation in the 
legislative and other processes of the 
National Council of Provinces, includ-
ing those of its committees.
Although the ruling was made on 




made in the ruling are significant. 
For example, the Court is alarmed by 
the continuity between CLARA and 
the Black Authorities Act, noting that 
this extends powers to apartheid-
established bodies. Paragraph 25 of the 
ruling notes:
Under apartheid, these steps were a 
necessary prelude to the assignment 
of African people to ethnically-based 
homelands. […] Section 5(1)(b) of the 
Black Administration Act became the 
most powerful tool to effect the re-
moval of African people from ‘white’ 
South Africa into areas reserved for 
them under this Act and the Devel-
opment Trust and Land Act. And as 
we noted in DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd 
v North West Provincial Government 
and Another 2001 (1) SA 500 (CC); 
2000 (4) BCLR 347 (CC)], ‘[t]hese re-
movals resulted in untold suffering’. 
The forced removals of African peo-
ple from the land which they occu-
pied to the limited amount of land 
reserved for them by the apartheid 
state resulted in the majority of Af-
rican people being dispossessed of 
their land. It also left a majority of 
them without legally secure tenure 
in land.
Objectors to TLGFA, CLARA and the 
Traditional Courts Bill (TCB) (currently 
before Parliament) have repeatedly 
drawn the government’s attention 
to this fault, to no avail. In retelling 
the history of the formation of 
the former homelands, the Court 
situates the undemocratic (and thus 
unconstitutional) nature of CLARA’s 
promulgation process in the context of 
the undemocratic policy move of basing 
the TLGFA on the Black Authorities 
Act. Since our Constitution is based 
on democracy, freedom and public 
participation, no law-making process 
should deviate from these values.
Reaffirming sentiments of previous 
decisions, the Court duly recognises 
customary law as a legitimate source 
of South African law in terms of the 
Constitution. It points out in Paragraph 
90 that the existence of living 
customary law as a form of regulation 
on the ground does not constitute a 
legal vacuum but a real presence that 
must be treated with due respect, even 
when state law interferes with some 
aspects of it:
[…] whether the community rules 
adopted under the provisions of 
CLARA replicate, record or codify 
indigenous law or represent an en-
tirely new set of rules which replace 
the indigenous-law-based system of 
land administration, the result is the 
same: a substantial impact on the in-
digenous law that regulates commu-
nal land in a particular community.
Therefore, the Court recognises public 
participation as important, not just in 
the process of promulgating law, but 
also in implementation and/or ongoing 
development of complementary living 
laws. This indicates that the Court has 
genuinely begun to think through how 
customs and rights might be reconciled 
even in the formal state law sphere, and 
how rights might be given expression 
in the context of living law.
These comments lay the groundwork 
for the type of legislation Parliament 
must pass to replace CLARA. They also 
problematise any other laws, such as 
the TCB, which:
are founded on jurisdictional • 
boundaries established by the 
Bantu Authorities Act
are drafted without consulting • 
ordinary rural citizens (who are 
therefore forcibly confined to 
arbitrary apartheid jurisdictions), 
but only traditional leaders, and
do not respect living customary • 





Decentralisation is not a problem in 
the context of South African consti-
tutional law. Indeed, democratic de-
centralisation is desirable in that it 
creates opportunities for lively, partic-
ipatory and even unconventional law 
making and enforcement. However, 
the process of decentralisation can be 
problematic when it tends towards 
despotic decentralisation, as is the 
trend in current legislation on ‘tradi-
tional law’.
Therefore, law making on ‘traditional 
law’ must include participatory 
processes that pay particular attention 
to how women articulate their rights 
in systems of living customary law. 
Rural women have been successful in 
exploiting various avenues open to 
them – in living customary law and 
state law – to gain greater power and 
secure more rights. These practices of 
weaving together a rights discourse 
with living customary law can inform 
national legislative processes. In turn, 
national legislative processes can then 
be used to secure women’s access to 
land and ensure their participation in 
traditional structures.
Clearly, decentralisation is not a 
panacea and problems arise – women 
can and often do still suffer – even under 
more desirable forms of decentralised 
government, as these do not always 
guarantee the most ideal legal 
outcomes. However, decentralised 
democracy should always be preferred 
to decentralised despotism.
Where government has failed to 
abandon undemocratic structures, 
genuinely incorporate public partici-
pation, and cater for living customary 
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law’s ongoing role – as in the TLGFA, 
CLARA and the TCB – the policy 
trend is contrary to the aims of our 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
judgment reinforces the ‘democratic’ 
element of democratic decentralisa-
tion (decentralised democracy) and 
must be taken seriously by government 
as mandated by the Constitution.
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Rural women must be actively involved in national • 
law making on traditional law.
Human (especially women’s) rights must be woven • 
together with living customary law in national law 
making on traditional law.
National law making on traditional law should not • 
use apartheid laws to define boundaries, but should 
instead let communities define their own boundaries 
in a participatory process.
Individuals should be able to opt out of a community • 
governed by traditional law.
Law making in South Africa should never deviate • 
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We are happy to announce the 
opening of a new space for 
democratic debate on policies 
and other key aspects of the 
politics and economics of land 
and agrarian change in southern 
Africa.
The Institute for Poverty, Land 
and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) has 
launched its blog:
h t t p : / / anot her c ount ry s ide .
wordpress.com
We have created this space where 
we – and you – can speak and 
argue and debate about key issues 
relating to land and agrarian 
change in the subcontinent. Let us 
all imagine another countryside.
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